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Abstract. We describe an implementation of fast elliptic curve scalar multiplication, optimized
for Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange at the 128-bit security level. The algorithms are compact
(using only x-coordinates), run in constant time with uniform execution patterns, and do not
distinguish between the curve and its quadratic twist; they thus have a built-in measure of side-
channel resistance. The core of our construction is a suite of two-dimensional differential addition
chains driven by efficient endomorphism decompositions, built on curves selected from a family
of Q-curve reductions over Fp2 with p = 2
127−1. We include state-of-the-art experimental results
for twist-secure, constant-time, x-coordinate-only scalar multiplication.
Keywords: Elliptic curve cryptography, scalar multiplication, twist-secure, side channel attacks,
endomorphism, Kummer variety, addition chains, Montgomery curve.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the design and implementation of state-of-the-art Elliptic Curve
Diffie–Hellman key exchange (ECDH) primitives for security level of approximately 128 bits.
The major priorities for our implementation are
1. Compactness: We target x-coordinate-only systems. These have the advantage of shorter
keys, simple and fast algorithms, and (in a well-designed system) the ability to use
arbitrary x-values, not just legitimate x-coordinates of points on a curve (the “illegitimate”
values are simply x-coordinates on the quadratic twist). For x-coordinate ECDH, the
elliptic curve exists only to supply formulæ for scalar multiplications, and a hard elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) to underwrite a hard computational Diffie-
Hellman problem (CDHP) on x-coordinates. The users should not have to verify whether
given values correspond to points on a curve, nor should they have to compute any quantity
that cannot be derived simply from x-coordinates alone. In particular, neither a user nor
an algorithm should have to distinguish between the curve and its quadratic twist—and
the curve must be chosen to be twist-secure.
2. Fast, constant-time execution: Every Diffie–Hellman key exchange is essentially
comprised of four scalar multiplications,5 so optimizing scalar multiplication P 7→ [m]P
for varying P and m is a very high priority. At the same time, a minimum requirement
for protecting against side-channel timing attacks is that every scalar multiplication
P 7→ [m]P must be computed in constant time (and ideally with the same execution
pattern), regardless of the values of m and P .
5 We do not count the cost of authenticating keys, etc., here. Two of the scalar multiplications can be
computed in advance in the case of static Diffie–Hellman; in this fixed-base scenario (where the point P
is constant but m varies) we could profit from extensive precomputations. For simplicity, in this work we
concentrate on the dynamic case (where P and m are variable).
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In our concrete implementation, we target a security level of approximately 128 bits
(comparable to Curve25519 [3], secp256r1 [26], or brainpoolP256t1 [11]). The reference
system with respect to our desired properties is Bernstein’s Curve25519, which is based on
an efficient, uniform differential addition chain applied to a well-chosen pair of curve and
twist. Curve25519 and its twist are presented as Montgomery models. These models not
only provide highly efficient group operations, but they are optimized for x-coordinate-only
operations; and crucially, they do not distinguish between the curve and its twist. Essentially,
well-chosen Montgomery curves offer compactness straight out of the box.
Having chosen Montgomery curves as our platform, we must implement a fast, uniform,
and constant-time scalar multiplication on x-coordinates of Montgomery models. To
turbocharge our scalar multiplication, we apply a combination of efficiently computable
pseudo-endomorphisms and two-dimensional differential addition chains. The use of efficient
endomorphisms follows in the tradition of [20,33,15,14], but to the best of our knowledge, this
work represents the first use of endomorphism scalar decompositions in the pure x-coordinate
setting (that is, without additional input to the addition chain).
Our implementation is built on a curve-twist pair (E , E ′) equipped with efficiently
computable endomorphisms (ψ, ψ′). The family of Q-curve reductions in [32] offer a
combination of fast endomorphisms and compatiblity with fast underlying field arithmetic.
Crucially (and unlike earlier endomorphism constructions such as [15,14]), they also offer the
possibility of twist-secure group orders over fast fields. One of these curves, with almost-prime
order over a 254-bit field, forms the foundation of our construction (see §2). Any other curve
from the same family over the same field could be used with only very minor modifications to
the formulæ below and the source code for our implementations; we explain our specific curve
choice in Appendix B. The endomorphisms ψ and ψ′ induce efficient pseudo-endomorphisms
ψx and ψ
′
x on the x-line; we explain their construction and use in §3.
The key idea of this work is to replace single scalar multiplications (m,x(P )) 7→ x([m]P )
with multiscalar multiexponentiations
((a, b), x(P )) 7−→ x([a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P )) or x([a]P ⊕ [b]ψ′(P )) ,
where (a, b) is either a short multiscalar decomposition of a random full-length scalar m (that
is, such that [m]P = [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P ) or [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ′(P )), or a random short multiscalar. The
choice of ψ or ψ′ formally depends on whether P is on E or E ′, but there is no difference
between ψ and ψ′ on the level of x-coordinates: they are implemented using exactly the same
formulæ. Given that every element of the base field is the x-coordinate of a point on E or
E ′, we may view the transformation above as acting purely on field elements, and not curve
points.
From a practical point of view, the two crucial differences compared with conventional
ECDH over a 254-bit field are
1. The use of 128-bit multiscalars (a, b) in Z2 in place of the 254-bit scalar m in Z. We
treat the geometry of multiscalars, the distribution of their corresponding scalar values,
and the derivation of constant-bitlength scalar decompositions in §4.
2. The use of two-dimensional differential addition chains to compute x([a]P⊕[b]ψ(P ))
given only (a, b) and x(P ). We detail this process in §5.
We have implemented three different two-dimensional differential addition chains: one due
to Montgomery [23] via Stam [34], one due to Bernstein [4], and one due to Azarderakhsh
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and Karabina [1]. We provide implementation details and timings for scalar multiplications
based on each of our chains in §6. Each offers a different combination of speed, uniformity,
and constant-time execution. The differential nature of these chains is essential in the x-
coordinate setting, which prevents the effective use of the vector chains traditionally used in
the endomorphism literature (such as [35]).
We will be putting detailed Magma code online. A complete mixed-assembly-and-C code
is publicly available in eBATS [5] format at
http://hhisil.yasar.edu.tr/files/hisil20131026compact.tar.gz
2 The curve
We begin by defining our curve-twist pair (E , E ′). We work over the field Fp2 = Fp(i), where
p := 2127 − 1 and i2 = −1 .
We have chosen this Mersenne prime for its compatibility with a range of fast techniques for
modular arithmetic, including Montgomery- and NIST-style approaches. We build efficient
Fp2-arithmetic on top of the fast Fp-arithmetic described in [10]. Appendix A provides a
complete description of our arithmetic routines.
In what follows, it will be convenient to define the constants
u := 1466100457131508421 , v := 12(p− 1) = 2126 − 1 , and w := 14(p+ 1) = 2125 .
The curve E and its twist E ′. We define E to be the elliptic curve over Fp2 with affine
Montgomery model
E : y2 = x(x2 +Ax+ 1) ,
where
A = A0 +A1 · i with
{
A0 = 45116554344555875085017627593321485421 ,
A1 = 2415910908 .
The element 12/A is not a square in Fp2 , so the curve over Fp2 defined by
E ′ : (12/A)y2 = x(x2 +Ax+ 1)
is a model of the quadratic twist of E . The twisting Fp4-isomorphism δ : E → E ′ is defined by
δ : (x, y) 7−→ (x, (A/12)1/2y). The map δ1 : (x, y) 7→ (xW , yW ) = (12A x + 4, 12
2
A2
y) defines an
Fp2-isomorphism between E ′ and the Weierstrass model
E2,−1,s : y2W = x3W + 2(9(1 + si)− 24)xW − 8(9(1 + si)− 16)
of [32, Theorem 1] with s = i(1− 8/A2) = 86878915556079486902897638486322141403, so E
is a Montgomery model of the quadratic twist of E2,−1,s (in the notation of [32, §5] we have
E ∼= E ′2,−1,s and E ′ ∼= E2,−1,s). All of these curves have j-invariant
j(E) = j(E ′) = j(E2,−1,s) = 28 (A
2 − 3)3
A2 − 4 = 2
6 (5− 3si)3(1− si)
(1 + s2)2
.
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Group orders, structures, and generators. Using the SEA algorithm [28], we find that
#E(Fp2) = 4N and #E ′(Fp2) = 8N ′
where
N = v2 + 2u2 and N ′ = 2w2 − u2
are 252-bit and 251-bit primes, respectively. Looking closer, we see that
E(Fp2) ∼= Z/2Z× Z/2Z× Z/NZ and E ′(Fp2) ∼= Z/2Z× Z/4Z× Z/N ′Z .
Recall that every element of Fp2 is either the x-coordinate of two points in E(Fp2), the x-
coordinate of two points in E ′(Fp2), or the x-coordinate of one point of order two in both E(Fp2)
and E ′(Fp2). The x-coordinates of the points of exact order 2 in E(Fp2) (and in E ′(Fp2)) are 0
and −12A ± 12
√
A2 − 4; the points of exact order 4 in E ′(Fp2) have x-coordinates ±1. Either
of the points with x-coordinate 2 will serve as a generator for the cryptographic subgroup
E(Fp2)[N ]; either of the points with x-coordinate 2− i generate E ′(Fp2)[N ′].
Curve points, x-coordinates, and random bitstrings. Being Montgomery curves, both
E and E ′ are compatible with the Elligator 2 construction [6, §5]. For our curves, [6, Theorem
5] defines efficiently invertible injective maps Fp2 → E(Fp2) and Fp2 → E ′(Fp2). This allows
points on E and/or E ′ to be encoded in such a way that they are indistinguishable from
uniformly random strings of bitlength 254. Since we work with x-coordinates only in this
article, a square root is saved when computing the injection (see [6, §5.5] for more details).
The ECDLP on E and E ′. Suppose we want to solve an instance of the DLP in E(Fp2)
or E ′(Fp2). Applying the Pohlig–Hellman–Silver reduction [24], we almost instantly reduce
to the case of solving a DLP instance in either E(Fp2)[N ] or E ′(Fp2)[N ′]. The best known
approach to solving such a DLP instance is Pollard’s rho algorithm [25], which (properly
implemented) can solve DLP instances in E(Fp2)[N ] (resp. E ′(Fp2)[N ′]) in around 12
√
πN ∼
2125.8 (resp. 12
√
πN ′ ∼ 2125.3) group operations on average [9]. One might expect that working
over Fp2 would imply a
√
2-factor speedup in the rho method by using Frobenius classes; but
this seems not to be the case, since neither E nor E ′ is a subfield curve (cf. [36, §6]).
The embedding degrees of E and E ′ with respect to N and N ′ are 150(N−1) and 12(N ′−1),
respectively, so ECDLP instances in E(Fp2)[N ] and E(Fp2)[N ′] are not vulnerable to the
Menezes–Okamoto–Vanstone [21] or Frey–Ru¨ck [13] attacks. The trace of E is p2+1−4N 6= ±1,
so neither E nor E ′ are amenable to the Smart–Satoh–Araki–Semaev attack [30,27,29].
While our curves are defined over a quadratic extension field, this does not seem to reduce
the expected difficulty of the ECDLP when compared to elliptic curves over similar-sized
prime fields. Taking the Weil restriction of E (or E ′) to Fp as in the Gaudry–Hess–Smart
attack [17], for example, produces a simple abelian surface over Fp; and the best known
attacks on DLP instances on simple abelian surfaces over Fp offer no advantage over simply
attacking the ECDLP on the original curve [31,16]. (See [14, §9] for further discussion.)
Superficially, E is what we would normally call twist-secure (in the sense of Bernstein [3]
and Fouque–Re´al–Lercier–Valette [12]), since its twist E ′ has a similar security level. Indeed,
E (and the whole class of curves from which it was drawn) was designed with this notion of
twist-security in mind. However, twist-security is more subtle in the context of endomorphism-
based scalar decompositions; we will return to this subject in §4 below.
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The endomorphism ring. Let πE denote the Frobenius endomorphism of E . The curve E
is ordinary (its trace tE is prime to p), so its endomorphism ring is an order in the quadratic
field K := Q(πE). (The endomorphism ring of an ordinary curve and its twist are always
isomorphic, so what holds below for E also holds for E ′.) We will see below that E has
an endomorphism ψ such that ψ2 = −[2]πE . The discriminant of Z[ψ] is the fundamental
discriminant
DK = −8 · 5 · 397 · 10528961 · 6898209116497 · 1150304667927101
of K, so Z[ψ] is the maximal order in K; hence, End(E) = Z[ψ].
The safecurves specification [8] suggests that the discriminant of the CM field should
have at least 100 bits; our E easily meets this requirement, since DK has 130 bits. We note
that well-chosen GLS curves can also have large CM field discriminants, but GLV curves have
tiny CM field discriminants by construction: for example, the endomorphism ring of the curve
secp256k1 [26] (at the heart of the Bitcoin system) has discriminant −3.
Brainpool [11] requires the ideal class number of K to be larger than 106; this property is
never satisfied by GLV curves, which have tiny class numbers (typically ≤ 2) by construction.
But E easily meets this requirement: the class number of End(E) is
h(End(E)) = h(DK) = 27 · 31 · 37517 · 146099 · 505117 ∼ 1019 .
3 The endomorphism on E and pseudo-endomorphisms on the x-line
Theorem 1 of [32] defines an efficient endomorphism
ψ2,−1,s : (xW , yW ) 7−→
(−xpW
2
− 9(1− si)
xpW − 4
,
ypW√−2
(−1
2
+
9(1− si)
(xpW − 4)2
))
of degree 2p on the Weierstrass model E2,−1,s, with kernel 〈(4, 0)〉. To avoid an ambiguity in
the sign of the endomorphism, we must fix a choice of
√−2 in Fp2 . We choose the “small” root:
√−2 := 264 · i . (1)
Applying the isomorphisms δ and δ1, we define efficient Fp2-endomorphisms
ψ := (δ1δ)
−1ψ2,−1,sδ1δ and ψ
′ := δψδ−1 = δ−11 ψ2,−1,sδ1
of degree 2p on E and E ′, respectively, each with kernel 〈(0, 0)〉. More explicitly: if we let
n(x) := A
p
A
(
x2 +Ax+ 1
)
, d(x) := −2x , m(x) := n′(x)d(x)− n(x)d′(x),
r(x) := A
p
A (x
2 − 1) , and s(x) := n(x)
p
d(x)p
,
then ψ and ψ′ are defined (using the same value of
√−2 fixed in Eq. (1)) by
ψ : (x, y) 7→
(
s(x) , −12
v
Av
yp√−2
m(x)p
d(x)2p
)
and ψ′ : (x, y) 7→
(
s(x) , −√−212
2v
A2v
ypr(x)p
d(x)2p
)
.
6 Craig Costello, Huseyin Hisil, and Benjamin Smith
The action of the endomorphisms on curve points. Theorem 1 of [32] tells us that
ψ2 = −[2]πE and (ψ′)2 = [2]πE ′ , (2)
where πE and πE ′ are the p
2-power Frobenius endomorphisms of E and E ′, respectively, and
P (ψ) = P (ψ′) = 0 , where P (T ) = T 2 − 4uT + 2p . (3)
If we restrict to the cryptographic subgroup E(Fp2)[N ], then ψ must act as multiplication by an
integer eigenvalue λ, one of the two roots of P (T ) modulo N . Similarly, ψ′ acts on E ′(Fp2)[N ′]
as multiplication by one of the roots λ′ of P (T ) modulo N ′. The correct eigenvalues are
λ ≡ −v
u
(mod N) and λ′ ≡ −2w
u
(mod N ′) .
Equation (2) implies that λ2 ≡ −2 (mod N) and λ′2 ≡ 2 (mod N ′). (Note that choosing the
other square root of −2 in Eq. (1) negates ψ, ψ′, λ, λ′, and u.)
To complete our picture of the action of ψ on E(Fp2) and ψ′ on E ′(Fp2), we describe its
action on the points of order 2 and 4 listed above. Choosing square roots appropriately:
(0, 0) 7−→ 0 under ψ and ψ′ ,(−12A± 12√A2 − 4, 0) 7−→ (0, 0) under ψ and ψ′ ,(
1,±12
√
A(A+ 2)/3
) 7−→ (−12A− 12√A2 − 4, 0) under ψ′ ,(−1,±12
√
−A(A+ 2)/3) 7−→ (−12A+ 12√A2 − 4, 0) under ψ′ .
(4)
Pseudo-endomorphisms on the x-line. One advantage of the Montgomery model is that
it allows a particularly efficient arithmetic using only the x-coordinate. Technically speaking,
this corresponds to viewing the x-line P1 as the Kummer variety of E : that is, P1 ∼= E/〈±1〉.
The x-line is not a group: if P and Q are points on E , then x(P ) and x(Q) determine
the pair {x(P ⊕Q), x(P ⊖Q)}, but not the individual elements x(P ⊕ Q) and x(P ⊖ Q).
However, the x-line inherits part of the endomorphism structure of E : every endomorphism φ
of E induces a pseudo-endomorphism6 φx : x 7→ φx(x) of P1, which determines φ up to sign;
and if φ1 and φ2 are two endomorphisms of E , then
(φ1)x(φ2)x = (φ2)x(φ1)x = (φ1φ2)x = (φ2φ1)x .
In addition7 to pseudo-doubling (DBL), pseudo-addition (ADD), and combined pseudo-
doubling and pseudo-addition (DBLADD) on P1, we need expressions for both ψx and (ψ ± 1)x
to initialise the addition chains in Section 5. Moving to projective coordinates, write x = X/Z
and y = Y/Z; then the negation map on E is [−1] : (X : Y : Z) 7→ (X : −Y : Z), and the
double cover E → E/〈[±1]〉 ∼= P1 is (X : Y : Z) 7→ (X : Z). The pseudo-doubling on P1 is
[2]x((X : Z)) =
(
(X + Z)2(X − Z)2 : (4XZ) ((X − Z)2 + A+24 · 4XZ)) . (5)
Our endomorphism ψ induces the pseudo-endomorphism
ψx((X : Z)) =
(
Ap
(
(X − Z)2 − A+22 (−2XZ)
)p
: A(−2XZ)p
)
.
Composing ψx with itself and comparing with Eq. (5), we confirm that ψxψx = −[2]x(πE)x.
6 “Pseudo-endomorphisms” are, strictly speaking, endomorphisms of the x-line P1. We use the term pseudo-
endomorphism here to avoid confusion with endomorphisms of elliptic curves, and also to fit with the use
of terms like “pseudo-addition” for operations on the x-line.
7 Montgomery’s formulæ for these operations are available in explicit form on the EFD [7].
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Proposition 1. With the notation above, and with the value of
√−2 chosen as in Eq. (1),
(ψ ± 1)x(x) = (ψ′ ± 1)x(x)
=
2s2nd4p − x(xn)pm2pAp−1 ∓ 2(1/A)(p−1)/2mps(xn)(p+1)/2d2pAp−1√−2
2s(x− s)2d4pAp−1 . (6)
Proof. If P and Q are points on a Montgomery curve By2 = x(x2 +Ax+ 1), then
x(P ±Q) = B (x(P )y(Q)∓ x(Q)y(P ))
2
x(P )x(Q) (x(P )− x(Q))2 .
Taking P = (x, y) to be a generic point on E (where B = 1), setting Q = ψ(P ), and using
y2 = −Ap2Adn to eliminate y yields the expression for (ψ ± 1)x above. The same process for E ′
(with B = 12A ), eliminating y with
12
A y
2 = −Ap2Adn, yields the same expression for (ψ′±1)x. ⊓⊔
Deriving explicit formulæ to compute the expression(s) in (6) is straightforward, so we
omit them for space considerations (but see our code online). If P ∈ E , then on input of
x(P ), the combined computation of the three projective elements (Xλ−1 : Zλ−1), (Xλ : Zλ),
(Xλ+1 : Zλ+1), which respectively correspond to the three affine elements x([λ−1]P ), x([λ]P ),
x([λ+ 1]P ), incurs 15 multiplications, 129 squarings and 10 additions in Fp2 . The bottleneck
of this computation is raising dn to the power of (p+1)/2 = 2126, which incurs 126 squarings.
We note that squarings are significantly faster than multiplications in Fp2 (see Appendix A).
4 Scalar decompositions
We want to evaluate scalar multiplications [m]P as [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P ), where
m ≡ a+ bλ (mod N)
and the multiscalar (a, b) has a significantly shorter bitlength8 than m. For our applications
we impose two extra requirements on multiscalars (a, b), so as to add a measure of side-channel
resistance:
1. both a and b must be positive, to avoid branching and to simplify our algorithms; and
2. the multiscalar (a, b) must have constant bitlength (that is, bitlength independent of
m as m varies over Z), so that multiexponentiation can run in constant time.
In some protocols—notably Diffie–Hellman—we are not interested in the particular values
of our random scalars, as long as those values remain secret. In this case, rather than starting
withm in Z/NZ (or Z/N ′Z) and finding a short, positive, constant-bitlength decomposition of
m, it would be easier to randomly sample some short, positive, constant-bitlength multiscalar
(a, b) from scratch. The sample space must be chosen to ensure that the corresponding
distribution of values a + bλ in Z/NZ does not make the discrete logarithm problem of
finding a+ bλ appreciably easier than if we started with a random m.
8 The bitlength of a scalar m is ⌈log2 |m|⌉; the bitlength of a multiscalar (a, b) is ⌈log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞⌉.
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The lattices of zero decompositions. The problems of finding good decompositions and
sampling good multiscalars are best addressed using the geometric structure of the spaces
of decompositions for E and E ′. The multiscalars (a, b) such that a + bλ ≡ 0 (mod N) or
a+ bλ′ ≡ 0 (mod N ′) form lattices
L = 〈(N, 0), (−λ, 1)〉 and L′ = 〈(N ′, 0), (−λ′, 1)〉 ,
respectively, with a + bλ ≡ c + dλ (mod N) if and only if (a, b) − (c, d) is in L (similarly,
a+ bλ′ ≡ c+ dλ′ (mod N ′) if and only if (a, b)− (c, d) is in L′).
The sets of decompositions of m for E(Fp)[N ] and E(Fp2)[N ′] therefore form lattice cosets
(m, 0) + L and (m, 0) + L′ ,
respectively; we can find short decompositions of m for E(Fp)[N ] (resp. E(Fp2)[N ′]) by
subtracting vectors near (m, 0) in L (resp. L′) from (m, 0). To find these vectors, we need
‖ · ‖∞-reduced9 bases for L and L′.
Proposition 2 (Definition of e1, e2, e
′
1, e
′
2). Up to order and sign, the shortest possible
bases for L and L′ (with respect to ‖ · ‖∞) are given by
L = 〈 e1 := (v, u) , e2 := (−2u, v) 〉 and
L′ = 〈 e′1 := (u,w) , e′2 := (2u− 2w, 2w − u) 〉 .
Proof. The proof of [32, Proposition 2] constructs sublattices 〈e˜1 := −2(v, u), e˜2 := −2(2u, v)〉
of index 4 in L and 〈e˜′1 := 2(2w,−u), e˜′2 := 4(u,w)〉 of index 8 in L′. We easily verify that
e1 = −12 e˜2 and e2 = −12 e˜1 are both in L; since 〈e˜1, e˜2〉 has index 4 in 〈e1, e2〉, we must have
L = 〈e1, e2〉. Similarly, both e′1 = 14 e˜′2 and e′2 = 12(e˜′2 − e˜′1) are in L′, and thus form a basis
for L′. According to [19, Definition 3], an ordered lattice basis [b1,b2] is ‖ · ‖∞-reduced if
‖b1‖∞ ≤ ‖b2‖∞ ≤ ‖b1 − b2‖∞ ≤ ‖b1 + b2‖∞ .
These conditions are satisfied for [b1,b2] = [e2,−e1] and [e′1, e′2], so (‖e2‖∞, ‖e1‖∞) (resp.
(‖e′1‖∞, ‖e′2‖∞)) are the successive minima of L (resp. L′) by [19, Theorem 5].10 ⊓⊔
In view of Proposition 2, the fundamental parallelograms of L and L′ are the regions of
the (a, b)-plane defined by
A := {(a, b) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ vb− ua < N and 0 ≤ 2ub+ va < N} ,
A′ := {(a, b) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ ub− wa < N ′ and 0 ≤ (2u− 2w)b− (2w − u)a < N ′} .
Every integer m has precisely one decomposition for E(Fp2)[N ] (resp. E ′(Fp2)[N ′]) in any
translate of A by L (resp. A′ by L′).
9 That is, reduced with respect to Kaib’s generalized Gauss reduction algorithm [19] for the infinity norm.
10 For the Euclidean norm, the bases [e1, e2] and [e
′
1, 2e
′
1 − e
′
2] are ‖ · ‖2-reduced, but [e
′
1, e
′
2] is not.
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Short, constant-bitlength scalar decompositions. Returning to the problem of finding
short decompositions of m: let (α, β) be the (unique) solution in Q2 to the system αe1+βe2 =
(m, 0). Since e1, e2 is reduced, the closest vector to (m, 0) in L is one of the four vectors
⌊α⌋e1+⌊β⌋e2, ⌊α⌋e1+⌈β⌉e2, ⌈α⌉e1+⌊β⌋e2, or ⌈α⌉e1+⌈β⌉e2 by [19, Theorem 19]. Following
Babai [2], we subtract ⌊α⌉e1 + ⌊β⌉e2 from (m, 0) to get a decomposition (a˜, b˜) of m; by the
triangle inequality, ‖(a˜, b˜)‖∞ ≤ 12(‖e1‖∞ + ‖e2‖∞). This decomposition is approximately the
shortest possible, in the sense that the true shortest decomposition is at most ±e1± e2 away.
Observe that ‖e1‖∞ = ‖e2‖∞ = 2126 − 1, so (a˜, b˜) has bitlength at most 126.
However, a˜ or b˜ may be negative (violating the positivity requirement), or have fewer
than 126 bits (violating the constant bitlength requirement). Indeed, m 7→ (a˜, b˜) maps Z onto
(A− 12(e1+e2))∩Z2. This region of the (a, b)-plane, “centred” on (0, 0), contains multiscalars
of every bitlength between 0 and 126—and the majority of them have at least one negative
component. We can achieve positivity and constant bitlength by adding a carefully chosen
offset vector from L, translating (A− 12(e1 + e2))∩Z2 into a region of the (a, b)-plane where
every multiscalar is positive and has the same bitlength. Adding 3e1 or 3e2 ensures that the
first or second component always has precisely 128 bits, respectively; but adding 3(e1 + e2)
gives us a constant bitlength of 128 bits in both. Theorem 3 makes this all completely explicit.
Theorem 3. Given an integer m, let (a, b) be the multiscalar defined by
a := m+ (3− ⌊α⌉) v − 2 (3− ⌊β⌉)u and b := (3− ⌊α⌉)u+ (3− ⌊β⌉) v ,
where α and β are the rational numbers
α := (v/N)m and β := −(u/N)m .
Then 2127 < a, b < 2128, and m ≡ a + bλ (mod N). In particular, (a, b) is a positive
decomposition of m, of bitlength exactly 128, for any m.
Proof. We have m ≡ a+ bλ (mod N) because (a, b) = (a˜, b˜) + 3(e1 + e2) ≡ (m, 0) (mod L),
where (a˜, b˜) is the translate of (m, 0) by the Babai roundoff ⌊α⌉e1 + ⌊β⌉e2 described above.
Now (a˜, b˜) lies in A− 12(e1 + e2), so (a, b) lies in A+ 52(e1, e2); our claim on the bitlength of
(a, b) follows because the four “corners” of this domain all have 128-bit components. ⊓⊔
Random multiscalars. As we remarked above, in a pure Diffie–Hellman implementation
it is more convenient to simply sample random multiscalars than to decompose randomly
sampled scalars. Proposition 4 shows that random multiscalars of at most 127 bits correspond
to reasonably well-distributed values in Z/NZ and in Z/N ′Z, in the sense that none of the
values occur more than one more or one fewer times than the average, and the exceptional
values are in O(
√
N). Such multiscalars can be trivially turned into constant-bitlength positive
128-bit multiscalars—compatible with our implementation—by (for example) completing a
pair of 127-bit strings with a 1 in the 128-th bit position of each component.
Proposition 4. Let B = [0, p]2; we identify B with the set of all pairs of strings of 127 bits.
1. The map B → Z/NZ defined by (a, b) 7→ a+bλ (mod N) is 4-to-1, except for 4(p−6u+4) ≈
4
√
2N values in Z/NZ with 5 preimages in B, and 8(u2−3u+2) ≈ 15
√
N values in Z/NZ
with only 3 preimages in B.
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2. The map B → Z/N ′Z defined by (a, b) 7→ a + bλ′ (mod N ′) is 8-to-1, except for 8u2 ≈
2
7
√
N ′ values with 9 preimages in B.
Proof (Sketch). For (1): the map (a, b) 7→ a + bλ (mod N) defines a bijection between each
translate of A∩Z2 by L and Z/NZ. Hence, every m in Z/NZ has a unique preimage (a0, b0)
in A ∩ Z2, so it suffices to count ((a0, b0) + L) ∩ B for each (a0, b0) in A ∩ Z2. Cover Z2 with
translates of A by L; the only points in Z2 that are on the boundaries of tiles are the points
in L. Dissecting B along the edges of translates of A and reassembling the pieces, we see
that 8v − 24u+ 20 < 4p multiscalars in B occur with multiplicity five, 8u2 − 24u+ 16 < p/9
with multiplicity three, and every other multiscalar occurs with multiplicity four. There are
therefore 4N + (8v− 24u+20)− (8u2− 24u+16) = (p+1)2 preimages in total, as expected.
The proof of (2) is similar to (1), but counting ((a, b) + L′) ∩ B as (a, b) ranges over A′. ⊓⊔
Twist-security with endomorphisms. We saw in §2 that DLPs on E and its twist E ′ have
essentially the same difficulty, while Proposition 4 shows that the real DLP instances presented
to an adversary by 127-bit multiscalar multiplications are not biased into a significantly more
attackable range. But there is an additional subtlety when we consider the fault attacks
considered in [3] and [12]: If we try to compute [m]P for P on E , but an adversary sneaks
in a point P ′ on the twist E ′ instead, then in the classical context the adversary can derive
m after solving the discrete logarithm [m mod N ′]P ′ in E ′(Fp2). But in the endomorphism
context, we compute [m]P as [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P ), and the attacker sees [a+bλ′]P ′, which is not [m
mod N ′]P ′ (or even [a+ bλ mod N ′]P ′); we should ensure that the values (a+ bλ′ mod N ′)
are not concentrated in a small subset of Z/N ′Z when (a, b) is a decomposition for E(Fp2)[N ].
This can be achieved by a similar argument to that of Proposition 4: the map Z/NZ→ Z/N ′Z
defined by m 7→ (a, b) 7→ a+ bλ′ (mod N ′) is a good approximation of a 2-to-1 mapping.
5 Two-dimensional differential addition chains
Addition chains are used to compute scalar multiplications using a sequence of group
operations (or pseudo-group operations). A one-dimensional addition chain computes [m]P
for a given integer m and point P ; a two-dimensional addition chain computes [a]P ⊕ [b]Q
for a given multiscalar (a, b) and points P and Q. In a differential addition chain, the
computation of any ADD P ⊕ Q is always preceded (at some earlier stage in the chain) by
the computation of its associated difference P ⊖Q. The simplest differential addition chain is
the original one-dimensional “Montgomery ladder” [22], which computes scalar multiplications
[m]P for a single exponent m and point P . Every ADD in the Montgomery ladder is in the
form [i]P ⊕ [i + 1]P , so every associated difference is equal to P . Several two-dimensional
differential addition chains have been proposed, targeting multi-exponentiations in elliptic
curves and other primitives; we suggest [4] and [34] for overviews.
In any two-dimensional differential chain computing [a]P ⊕ [b]Q for general P and Q,
the input consists of the multiscalar (a, b) and the three points P , Q, and P ⊖Q. The initial
difference P⊖Q (or equivalently, the initial sum P⊕Q) is essential to kickstart the chain on P
and Q, since otherwise (by definition) P ⊕Q cannot appear in the chain. As we noted in §1,
computing this initial difference is an inconvenient obstruction to pure x-coordinate only
multiexponentiations on general input: the pseudo-group operations ADD, DBL, and DBLADD
can all be made to work on x-coordinates (the ADD and DBLADD operations make use of the
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associated differences that are available in a differential chain), but in general it is impossible
to compute the initial difference x(P ⊖Q) in terms of x(P ) and x(Q).
For our application, we want to compute x([a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P )) given inputs (a, b) and x(P ).
Crucially, we can compute x(P ⊖ψ(P )) as (ψ− 1)x(x(P )) using Proposition 1; this allows us
to compute x([a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P )) using two-dimensional differential addition chains with input
(a, b), x(P ), ψx(x(P )), and (ψ − 1)x(x(P )).
We have implemented one one-dimensional differential addition chain (LADDER) and
three two-dimensional differential addition chains (PRAC, AK, and DJB). We briefly describe
each chain, with its relative benefits and drawbacks, below.
(Montgomery) LADDER chains. We implemented the full-length one-dimensional
Montgomery ladder, as a reference to assess the speedup that our techniques offer over
conventional scalar multiplication (It is also used as a subroutine within PRAC). The ladder
can be made constant-time by adding a suitable multiple of N to the input scalar.
PRAC chains. Montgomery [23] proposed a number of algorithms for generating differential
addition chains that are often much shorter than his eponymous ladder. His one-dimensional
“PRAC” routine contains an easily-implemented two-dimensional subroutine, which computes
the double-exponentiation [a]P ⊕ [b]Q very efficiently. The downside for our purposes is that
the chain is not uniform: different inputs (a, b) give rise to different execution patterns,
rendering the routine vulnerable to a number of side-channel attacks. Our implementation
of this chain follows Algorithm 3.25 of [34]11: given a multiscalar (a, b) and points P , Q,
and P −Q, this algorithm computes d = gcd(a, b) and R = [ad ]P ⊕ [ bd ]Q. To finish computing
[a]P ⊕ [b]Q, we write d = 2ie with i ≥ q and e odd, then compute S = [2i]R with i consecutive
DBLs, before finally computing [e]S with a one-dimensional LADDER chain12.
AK chains. Azarderakhsh and Karabina [1] recently constructed a two-dimensional
differential addition chain which offers some middle ground in the trade-off between uniform
execution and efficiency. While it is less efficient than PRAC, their chain has the advantage
that all but one of the iterations consist of a single DBLADD; this uniformity may be enough
to thwart some simple side-channel attacks. The single iteration which does not use a DBLADD
requires a separate DBL and ADD, and this slightly slower step can appear at different stages of
the algorithm. The location of this longer step could leak some information to a side-channel
adversary under some circumstances, but we can protect against this by replacing all of the
DBLADDs with separate DBL and ADDs, incurring a very minor performance penalty. A more
serious drawback for this chain is its variable length: the total number of iterations depends
on the input multiscalar. This destroys any hope of achieving a runtime that is independent
of the input. Nevertheless, depending on the physical threat model, this chain may still be a
suitable alternative. Our implementation of this chain follows Algorithm 1 in [1].
DJB chains. Bernstein gives the fastest known two-dimensional differential chain that is
both fixed length and uniform [4, §4]. This chain is slightly slower than the PRAC and AK
chains, but it offers stronger resistance against many side-channel attacks.13 If the multiscalar
11 We implemented the binary version of Montgomery’s two-dimensional PRAC chain, neglecting the ternary
steps in [23, Table 4] (see also [34, Table 3.1]). Including these ternary steps could be significantly faster
than our implementation, though it would require fast explicit formulæ for tripling on Montgomery curves.
12 In practice d is very small, so there is little benefit in using a more complicated chain for this final step.
13 It would be interesting to implement our techniques with Bernstein’s non-uniform two-dimensional extended-
gcd differential addition chain [4]. This chain can outperform two-dimensional PRAC, though it “takes more
time to compute and is not easy to analyse”.
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(a, b) has bitlength ℓ, then this chain requires precisely ℓ−1 iterations, each of which computes
one ADD and one DBLADD. In our case, Theorem 3 allows us to fix the number of iterations at
127. The execution pattern of the multiexponentiation is therefore independent of the input,
and will run in constant time. It takes some work to organise the description in [4] into a
concrete algorithm; we give an algorithm specific to our chosen curve in Appendix C.
Operation counts. Table 1 profiles the number of high-level operations required by each
of our addition chain implementations on E . We used the decomposition in Theorem 3 to
guarantee positive constant-bitlength multiscalars. In situations where side-channel resistance
is not a priority, and the AK or PRAC chain is preferable, variable-length decompositions
could be used: these would give lower operation counts and slightly faster average timings.
Table 1. Pseudo-group operation counts per scalar multiplication on the x-line of E for the
2-dimensional DJB, AK and PRAC chains (using endomorphism decompositions) and the 1-
dimensional LADDER. The counts for LADDER and DJB are exact; those for PRAC and AK
are averages, with corresponding standard deviations, over 106 random trials (random scalars
and points). In addition to the operations listed here, each chain requires a final Fp2-inversion
to convert the result into affine form.
chain dim. endomorphisms #DBL #ADD #DBLADD
ψx, (ψ ± 1)x av. std. dev. av. std. dev. av. std. dev.
LADDER 1 — 1 — — — 253 —
DJB 2 affine 1 — 128 — 127 —
AK 2 affine 1 — 1 — 179.6 6.7
PRAC 2 projective 0.2 0.4 113.8 11.6 73.4 11.1
The LADDER and DJB chains offer some slightly faster high-level operations. In these
chains, the “difference elements” fed into the ADDs are fixed; if these points are affine, then this
saves one Fp2-multiplication for every ADD. In LADDER, the difference is always the affine
x(P ), so these savings come for free. In DJB, the difference is always one of the four values
x(P ), ψx(x(P )), or (ψ ± 1)x(x(P )), so a shared inversion is used to convert ψx(x(P )) and
(ψ ± 1)x(x(P )) from projective to affine coordinates. While this costs one Fp2-inversion and
six-Fp2 multiplications, it saves 253 Fp2-inversions inside the loop.
6 Timings
Table 2 lists cycle counts for our implementations run on an Intel Core i7-3520M (Ivy
Bridge) processor at 2893.484 MHz with hyper-threading turned off, over-clocking (“turbo-
boost”) disabled, and all-but-one of the cores switched off in BIOS. The implementations
were compiled with gcc 4.6.3 and tested on a 64-bit Linux environment. All cycle counts were
obtained using the SUPERCOP toolkit [5].
The most meaningful performance comparison we can draw is with Bernstein’s
Curve25519 software. Like our software, Curve25519 works entirely on the x-line, from start
to finish; using the uniform one-dimensional Montgomery ladder, it runs in constant time.
Thus, fair performance comparisons can only be made between his implementation and the
two of ours that are also both uniform and constant-time: LADDER and DJB. Benchmarked
on our hardware with all settings as above, Curve25519 scalar multiplications ran in 182,000
cycles on average. Looking at Table 2, we see that using the one-dimensional LADDER on the
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Table 2. Performance timings for four different implementations of compact, x-coordinate-
only scalar multiplications targeting the 128-bit security level. Timings are given for the
one-dimensional Montgomery ladder, as well as the two-dimensional (DJB, AK and PRAC)
chains that benefit from the application of an endomorphism and subsequent short scalar
decompositions.
addition chain dimension uniform? constant time? cycles
LADDER 1 ✓ ✓ 152,000
DJB 2 ✓ ✓ 145,000
AK 2 ✓ ✗ 130,000
PRAC 2 ✗ ✗ 110,000
x-line of E gives a factor 1.20 speed up over Curve25519, while combining an endomorphism
with the two-dimensional DJB chain on the x-line of E gives a factor 1.26 speed up over
Curve25519.
While there are several other implementations targeting the 128-bit security level that give
faster performance numbers than ours, we reiterate that our aim was to push the boundary
in the arena of implementations that are purely x-coordinate-only.
Hamburg [18] has also documented a fast software implementation employing x-
coordinate-only Montgomery arithmetic. However, it is difficult to compare Hamburg’s
software with ours: his is not available to be benchmarked, and his figures were obtained on
the Sandy Bridge architecture (they were also manually scaled back to compensate for turbo-
boost being enabled). Nevertheless, Hamburg’s own comparison with Curve25519 suggests
that a fair comparison between our constant-time implementations and his would be close.
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A Efficient arithmetic in Fp and Fp2
We access lower level integer arithmetic for efficient addition, subtraction, multiplication and
squaring operations in Fp and Fp2 where p = 2
127− 1, see §2. At this level, elements of Fp are
represented by integer values in the usual way, with the exception that the representation of
0 is not unique: 0 is allowed to be represented in “semi-reduced” form by the integers 0 and
p. Semi-reduced values can be used in any chain of operations without causing an exception,
since all of our algorithms are designed to accept inputs and produce outputs in the interval
[0, p]. The implementor should reduce each output into the range [0, p) at the very end of
the target computation, in order to satisfy unique representation field elements. This type of
arithmetic has already been exploited in earlier works, such as [10], but a thorough exposition
has not yet appeared.
We will be frequently referring back to the divisibility lemma of integers.
Lemma 5. Let u, v ∈ Z with v > 0. Then there exist unique q, r ∈ Z such that u = r + qv
and 0 ≤ r < v. In particular, q = ⌊u/v⌋ and r = u− ⌊u/v⌋v where ⌊.⌋ is the floor function.
In what follows, the “mod 2128” and “mod 2256” operators, are included (even though
they are often unnecessary) to reinforce the fact that all arithmetic operations are being
performed on an unsigned integer arithmetic circuit over a 128-bit data type. We let ki
denote the ith significant bit of an integer k and use (ki, . . . , kj) to denote the integer formed
by the bit-string that starts with ki, continues with bits in order of increasing significance,
and ends with kj (with 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 127). This is a Big-endian type representation. Although
it is possible to provide much shorter arguments for sections A.1-5, we prefer to keep the
notes in longer format in order to assist easier verification.
It should be noted that all of the techniques in this section avoid branching. This is
highly desirable for an efficient implementation, especially on an architecture with pipelining
capability.
A.1 Semi-reduced addition modulo p
The operation (a+ b) mod p is replaced by Algorithm 1.
Input: a, b ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ p.
Output: f ∈ Z such that f ≡ (a+ b) (mod p) and 0 ≤ f ≤ p.
1 c := (a+ b) mod 2128;
2 d := (c0, c1, . . . , c126), e := (c127);
3 f := (d+ e) mod 2128;
4 return f ;
Algorithm 1: Semi-reduced addition modulo p
– Line-1: Notice that 0 ≤ c = a+ b ≤ 2p < 2128.
– Line-2: Use Lemma 5 to write c = d + 2127e for integers 0 ≤ d < 2127 and e. There are
two cases to investigate:
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• Case 1: Assume that a + b ≤ p. The bounds on c and d imply that ⌊0/2127⌋ ≤⌊
c/2127
⌋
=
⌊
(d+ 2127e)/2127
⌋
=
⌊
d/2127
⌋
+
⌊
2127e/2127
⌋
= e ≤ ⌊p/2127⌋, so e = 0.
Thus a+ b ≡ d+ 2127e ≡ d+ 2127 · 0 ≡ d+ 0 ≡ d+ e (mod p).
• Case 2: Assume that a + b > p. Then p < c ≤ 2p. The bounds on c and d imply
that
⌊
(p+ 1)/2127
⌋ ≤ e ≤ ⌊2p/2127⌋, so e = 1. The bounds on c also imply that
p − 2127 < c − 2127 ≤ 2p − 2127 and we have d = c − 2127e = c − 2127, so 0 ≤ d < p.
Thus a+ b ≡ d+ 2127e ≡ d+ 2127 · 1 ≡ d+ 1 ≡ d+ e (mod p).
– Line-3: A semi-reduced output is given by f := (d+e) mod 2128, observing that 0 ≤ f ≤ p.
A.2 Semi-reduced subtraction modulo p
The operation (a− b) mod p is replaced by Algorithm 2.
Input: a, b ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ p.
Output: f ∈ Z such that f ≡ (a− b) (mod p) and 0 ≤ f ≤ p.
1 c := (a− b) mod 2128;
2 d := (c0, c1, . . . , c126), e := (c127);
3 f := (d− e) mod 2128;
4 return f ;
Algorithm 2: Semi-reduced subtraction modulo p
– Line-1: Notice that 0 ≤ c < 2128.
– Line-2: Use Lemma 5 to write c = d + 2127e for integers 0 ≤ d < 2127 and e. There are
two cases to investigate:
• Case 1: Assume that a ≥ b. Then 0 ≤ c = a − b ≤ p. The bounds on c and d
imply that
⌊
0/2127
⌋ ≤ ⌊c/2127⌋ = ⌊(d+ 2127e)/2127⌋ = e ≤ ⌊p/2127⌋, so e = 0. Thus
a− b ≡ d+ 2127e ≡ d− e (mod p).
• Case 2: Assume that a < b. Then c = 2128+a−b and−p ≤ a−b < 0. So, 2127 < c < 2128.
The bounds on c and d imply that
⌊
(2127 + 1)/2127
⌋ ≤ e ≤ ⌊(2128 − 1)/2127⌋, so e = 1.
The bounds on c also imply that 2127 − 2127 < c − 2127 < 2128 − 2127, and we have
d = c− 2127e = c− 2127. So, 0 < d ≤ p and d ≥ e. Thus a− b ≡ (2128+ a− b)− 2128 ≡
c− 2128 ≡ d+ 2127e− 2128 ≡ d− e (mod p).
Line-3: A semi-reduced output is given by f := (d−e) mod 2128, observing that 0 ≤ f ≤ p.
A.3 Semi-reduced multiplication modulo p
The operation (ab) mod p is replaced by Algorithm 3.
– Line-1: Notice that 0 ≤ c = ab ≤ p2 < 2256.
– Line-2: Use Lemma 5 to write c = d+ 2127e for integers 0 ≤ d < 2127 and e. The bounds
on c and d imply that
⌊
0/2127
⌋ ≤ ⌊c/2127⌋ = ⌊(d+ 2127e)/2127⌋ = e ≤ ⌊p2/2127⌋, so
0 ≤ e < p.
– Line-3: Noting that ab ≡ d+2127e ≡ d+(2127−1)e+e ≡ d+pe+e ≡ d+e (mod p), that
0 ≤ d, e ≤ p, and that 0 ≤ d+ e ≤ 2p, a semi-reduced output is obtained by Algorithm 1
applied on the operands d and e.
Faster Compact Diffie-Hellman: Endomorphisms on the x-line 17
Input: a, b ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ p.
Output: f ∈ Z such that f ≡ (ab) (mod p) and 0 ≤ f ≤ p.
1 c := (ab) mod 2256;
2 d := (c0, c1, . . . , c126), e := (c127, c128, . . . , c253);
3 f := semi-add(d, e);
4 return f ;
Algorithm 3: Semi-reduced multiplication modulo p
A.4 Lazy semi-reduction modulo p following a double-word addition
The lazy reduction (abˆ+ aˆb) mod p is replaced by Algorithm 4.
Input: a, aˆ, b, bˆ ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ a, aˆ, b, bˆ ≤ p.
Output: h ∈ Z such that h ≡ (abˆ+ aˆb) (mod p) and 0 ≤ h ≤ p.
1 c := (abˆ+ aˆb) mod 2256;
2 d := (c0, c1, . . . , c126), e := (c127, c128, . . . , c253), f := (c254);
3 g := (e+ f) mod 2128;
4 h := semi-add(d, g);
5 return h;
Algorithm 4: Lazy semi-reduction modulo p following a double-word addition
– Line-1: Notice that 0 ≤ c = abˆ+ aˆb ≤ 2p2 < 2256.
– Line-2: Use Lemma 5 to write c = d+ 2127(e+ 2127f) for integers 0 ≤ d, e < 2127 and f .
There are two cases to investigate:
• Case 1: Assume that abˆ + aˆb < (p+ 1)2. Then 0 ≤ c < (p+ 1)2. The bounds on c, d,
and e imply that
⌊
0/(2127)2
⌋ ≤ ⌊c/(2127)2⌋ = ⌊(d+ 2127e+ (2127)2f)/(2127)2⌋ = f ≤⌊
((p+ 1)2 − 1)/(2127)2⌋, so f = 0. Thus abˆ+ aˆb ≡ d+ 2127(e+ 2127f) ≡ d+ 2127(e+
2127 · 0) ≡ d+ 2127(e+ 0) ≡ d+ 2127(e+ f) (mod p) and 0 ≤ e+ f < p.
• Case 2: Assume that abˆ + aˆb ≥ (p + 1)2. Then (p + 1)2 ≤ c ≤ 2p2. The bounds on
c, d, and e imply that
⌊
(p+ 1)2/(2127)2
⌋ ≤ f ≤ ⌊2p2/(2127)2⌋, so f = 1. The bounds
on c also imply that (p + 1)2 − (2127)2 ≤ c − (2127)2 ≤ 2p2 − (2127)2, and we have
d + 2127e = c − (2127)2f = c − (2127)2. So, 0 ≤ d + 2127e ≤ ((p − 1)2 − 2). The
bounds on d+2127e imply that
⌊
0/2127
⌋ ≤ ⌊(d+ 2127e)/2127⌋ ≤ ⌊((p− 1)2 − 2)/2127⌋,
so 0 ≤ e < (p − 2). Thus abˆ + aˆb ≡ d + 2127(e + 2127f) ≡ d + 2127(e + 2127 · 1) ≡
d+ 2127(e+ 1) ≡ d+ 2127(e+ f) (mod p) and 0 ≤ e+ f < p.
– Line-3: Set g := (e+ f) mod 2128 where 0 ≤ g ≤ p.
– Line-4: Noting that d+ 2127(e+ 2127f) ≡ d+ 2127g ≡ d+ g (mod p), that 0 ≤ d, g ≤ p,
and that 0 ≤ d + g ≤ 2p, a semi-reduced output is obtained by Algorithm 1 applied on
the operands d and g.
A.5 Lazy semi-reduction modulo p following a double-word subtraction
The lazy reduction (ab− aˆbˆ) mod p is replaced by Algorithm 5.
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Input: a, aˆ, b, bˆ ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ a, aˆ, b, bˆ ≤ p.
Output: h ∈ Z such that h ≡ (ab− aˆbˆ) (mod p) and 0 ≤ h ≤ p.
1 c := (ab− aˆbˆ) mod 2256;
2 d := (c0, c1, . . . , c126), e := (c127, c128, . . . , c253), f := (c254), g := (c255);
3 h := (e− f) mod 2128;
4 j := semi-add(d, g);
5 return j;
Algorithm 5: Lazy semi-reduction modulo p following a double-word subtraction
– Line-1: Notice that 0 ≤ c < 2256.
– Line-2: Use Lemma 5 to write c = d+ 2127(e+ 2127(f + 2g)) for integers 0 ≤ d, e < 2127,
0 ≤ f < 2, and g. There are two cases to investigate:
• Case 1: Assume that ab ≥ aˆbˆ. Then 0 ≤ c = ab− aˆbˆ ≤ p2. The bounds on c, d, e and
f imply that
⌊
0/(2127)2
⌋ ≤ ⌊c/(2127)2⌋ = ⌊(d+ 2127e+ (2127)2(f + 2g))/(2127)2⌋ =
f+2g ≤ ⌊p2/(2127)2⌋; that is f+2g = 0. So, f = g = 0. Thus d+2127(e+2127(f+2g)) ≡
d+ 2127(e+ 2127 · 0) ≡ d+ 2127(e− 0) ≡ d+ 2127(e− f) (mod p).
• Case 2: Assume that ab < aˆbˆ. Then c = 2256 + ab − aˆbˆ and −p2 ≤ ab − aˆbˆ < 0. So,
2256 − p2 ≤ c < 2256. As in the previous case, the bounds on c, d, e and f imply that⌊
(2256 − p2)/(2127)2⌋ ≤ f + 2g ≤ ⌊(2256 − 1)/(2127)2⌋, so f + 2g = 3 and f = g = 1.
The bounds on c also imply that 2256 − p2 − 3(2127)2 = 2128 − 1 ≤ c − 3(2127)2 <
2256 − 3(2127)2 and we also have d + 2127e = c − (2127)2(f + 2g) = c − 3(2127)2.
So, 2128 − 1 ≤ d + 2127e. The bounds on d + 2127e imply that ⌊(2128 − 1)/2127⌋ ≤⌊
(d+ 2127e)/2127
⌋
<
⌊
(2256 − 3(2127)2)/2127⌋ = 2127, so 1 ≤ e < 2127 and e ≥ f . Thus
ab− aˆbˆ ≡ (2256 + ab− aˆbˆ)− 2256 = c− 2256 ≡ c− 4
≡ d+ 2127(e+ 2127(f + 2g))− 4
≡ d+ 2127(e+ 2127(1 + 2 · 1))− 4
≡ d+ 2127(e− 1) ≡ d+ 2127(e− f) (mod p).
– Line-3: Set h := (e− f) mod 2128 where 0 ≤ h ≤ p.
– Line-4: Noting that d + 2127(e + 2127(f + 2g)) ≡ d + 2127h ≡ d + h (mod p), that 0 ≤
d, h ≤ p, and that 0 ≤ d + h ≤ 2p, a semi-reduced output is obtained by Algorithm 1
applied on the operands d and h.
A.6 Addition and subtraction in Fp2
Let a, aˆ, b, bˆ ∈ Z and 0 ≤ a, aˆ, b, bˆ ≤ p. We use the obvious method which computes (a +
aˆi) + (b+ bˆi) as ((a+ b) mod p) + ((aˆ+ bˆ) mod p)i. Both modular additions are replaced by
Algorithm 1. Analogous comments apply for the case of subtraction which uses Algorithm 2.
A.7 Multiplication in Fp2
Let a, aˆ, b, bˆ ∈ Z and 0 ≤ a, aˆ, b, bˆ ≤ p. On the target architecture, we experienced the best
performance for computing (a+aˆi)(b+bˆi) by coupling a Karatsuba-based operation scheduling
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with two lazy reductions. This computes the product as
(
(ab− aˆbˆ) mod p
)
+
([
(a+ aˆ)(b+ bˆ)− ab− aˆbˆ] mod p)i.
The routine starts with two integer additions t0 := a+ aˆ and t1 := b+ bˆ satisfying 0 ≤ t0, t1 <
(2128 − 1). The routine continues with the 3 integer multiplications t2 := t0t1, t3 := ab and
t4 := aˆbˆ satisfying 0 ≤ t2 ≤ (2128 − 2)2 < 2256 and 0 ≤ t3, t4 ≤ (2127 − 1)2 < 2254. Since
t2 > t3 and (t2 − t3) > t4, the integer value t5 := (t2 − t3) − t4 is positive and satisfies both
0 ≤ t5 ≤ 2p2 < 2255 and t5 = abˆ + aˆb. The reduction of t5 is performed as in Algorithm 4.
The reduction of t6 := (t3 − t4) mod 2256 is performed as in Algorithm 5.
A.8 Squaring in Fp2
Let a, aˆ, b, bˆ ∈ Z and 0 ≤ a, aˆ, b, bˆ ≤ p. On the target architecture, we experienced that a lazy
semi-reduction strategy gives the same timings as the (non-lazy) semi-reduction strategy for
computing (a+ aˆi)2 =
(
(a− aˆ)(a+ aˆ))+ (2aaˆ)i.
A.9 Other operations in Fp2
Many other Fp2 operations can be efficiently performed by Fp arithmetic only. For instance,
negation can be performed as −a = (0− a)+ (0− aˆ)i, p-th powering as ap = a+(0− aˆ)i, and
inversion as a−1 = a(a2 + aˆ2)p−2 + (0 − aˆ(a2 + aˆ2)p−2)i – our Fp2-inversion implementation
incurs 128 Fp-squarings, 12 Fp-multiplications and 2 Fp-additions/subtractions.
B How was this curve chosen?
The particular curve-twist pair described in Section 2 was chosen from the family of degree-2
Q-curve reductions described in [32, Proposition 3]. This family (over Fp2) is parameterised
by a free parameter s in Fp, and covers at least p − 3 different isomorphism classes for any
given p. Every curve in the family is equipped with an efficient endomorphism, and the
arithmetic properties of the family make it possible to find twist-secure curves in the family.
We chose our curve E from this family as follows. First, we fixed p = 2127− 1; a Mersenne
prime, this p facilitates very fast modular arithmetic. Next, we chose a tiny nonsquare to define
Fp2 = Fp(
√−1); this makes Fp2-arithmetic slightly easier, and our formulæ much simpler.
We then needed to find a twist-secure curve E in the family with a rational transformation
into Montgomery form. This means that E had to have order divisible by 4, so optimal group
order for E was therefore #E = 4N , with N prime; it follows (from p2 ≡ 1 mod 4) that the
optimal group order for E ′ is then #E ′ = 8N ′, with N ′ is prime. Our curve search therefore
discarded parameter values corresponding to pairs that did not have these optimal cofactors.
To optimise performance, we searched for parameter values s in Fp that gave rise to
Montgomery representations whose constant A in Fp2 had “small” coefficients: that is, for
A = A0+A1i with A0 and A1 in Fp, we wanted the integer representation of A0 and A1 to be
small. However, the construction in [32, §5] requires the constant A to satisfy 8/A2 = 1 + si,
from which it plainly follows that
A40 + 2A
2
0A
2
1 +A
4
1 + 8(A
2
1 −A20) = 0 (7)
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in Fp. This means that, for any fixed value of A1 in Fp, there are at most four corresponding
possibilities for A0 ∈ Fp, which can be found as the roots of a quartic equation over Fp (and
vice versa). Keeping in mind that we need to search over many values of A to find a twist-
secure pair (E , E ′), the upshot of (7) is that we cannot expect to find a cryptographically
suitable curve with both A0 and A1 being small. The Fp2-arithmetic described in Appendix A
places no preference on which of these two coefficients is small, so we flipped a coin and
conducted our search choosing A1 to be small
14: we restricted our search to A1 values
with integer representations less than 232, so that A1 would only occupy one word on 32-
bit and 64-bit platforms. Our search also prioritised A1 whose integer representations had
low signed Hamming-weight, in the hope that multiplication by A1 might possibly be faster
when computed via sequence of additions and shifts. When the integer representation of A1
had a signed Hamming-weight of 1,2 or 3, we did not find any curve-twist pairs with optimal
cofactors; however, when further loosening the search to include those A1 with a corresponding
signed Hamming-weight of 4, we found 10 such pairs. Among these, there are 3 whose A1 had
an integer representation of precisely 32 bits – the curve in Section 2 corresponds to the
smallest such A1. Although the low signed Hamming-weight of A1 did not end up being
useful in our implementation, its small size did give rise to a minor but noticeable speedup.
The takeaway message is that the construction in [32, §5] is flexible enough to find a
vast number of twist-secure curves over any quadratic extension field, for which all of the
discussion in this paper can either be directly applied or easily modified (regardless of how
the parameter search is designed). Such curve-twist pairs can be readily found in a verifiably
random manner, following, for instance, the method described in [11, §5].
For example: let H be a hash function, and let π(i) be the string consisting of the first
i digits of π (without the decimal), i.e. π(1) = “3”, π(2) = “31”, π(3) = “314”, and so on.
Starting with i = 1, we conducted some other searches by taking s := H(π(i)) mod p until we
found the first curve-twist pair E and E ′ with optimal cofactors 4 and 8. With H = SHA− 1,
the first pair was found at i = 19244; and, with H = SHA− 256, the first pair was found at
i = 41004. Our discussion and software can easily be modified to handle such cases.
C Bernstein’s uniform two-dimensional differential addition chain
Algorithm 6 is a concrete adaptation of Bernstein’s addition chain [4, §4] to our curve E ,
following the multiscalar decomposition described in Section 4. We use the usual formulæ
(see [7]) for pseudo-doubling, pseudo-addition, and for the combination of the two, writing
their inputs and outputs as follows. For pseudo-doubling, we write
x([2]R) = DBL(x(R)) ;
for pseudo-addition, we write
x(T ⊕ U) = ADD(x(T ), x(U), x(T ⊖ U)) ;
and for their combined computation, we write
x([2]R), x(R⊕ S) = DBLADD(x(R), x(S), x(R⊖ S)) .
14 We also included the restriction that the integer representation of A1 be congruent to 2 modulo 4, since it
is actually the constant (A+ 2)/4 which is used in Montgomery’s formulæ [22, p. 261].
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The main iterations in the chain compute a DBLADD alongside a standalone ADD, so we denote
combined pseudo-doubling and pseudo-addition by
x([2]R), x(R⊕ S), x(T ⊕ U) = DBLDBLADD(x(R), x(S), x(R⊖ S), x(T ), x(U), x(T ⊖ U)) .
The chain is determined in its entirety using only bit operations before any arithmetic is
done on the x-line (the symbols ⊕ and ⊖ denote bit operations in Lines 3-9 of Algorithm 2,
but curve operations everywhere else).
Observe that the associated differences in pseudo-additions are always one of the four
affine input points x(P ), x(Q), x(P ⊖Q), or x(P ⊕Q). On the other hand, the three running
values T0 = (X0 : Z0), T1 = (X1 : Z1) and T2 = (X2 : Z2) are projective. Thus, the final step
(which chooses one of the three running values to output) will involve an Fp2-inversion to
output Tindfinal in affine form.
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Input: a, b ∈ Z+ (both 128 bits - see Theorem 3), and
x(P ), x(Q), x(Q⊖ P ), x(Q⊕ P ) (four affine elements on the x-line, where Q = ψ(P ) on E)
Output: x([a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P ))
1 initialization: (a)2 = (a127, . . . , a0) ∈ {0, 1}
128, (b)2 = (b127, . . . , b0) ∈ {0, 1}
128.
2 z0, z1, z2, z3 ← (). /* z’s start as empty bit-sequences */
3 if a0 ⊕ b0 = 1 then indfinal ← 2
4 else indfinal ←∼ b0
5 end
6 addfirst ← a0. /* addfirst ∈ {0, 1} */
7 for i← 0 to 126 do /* z0, . . . z3 ∈ {0, 1}
127 at end of loop */
8 aˆ = ai ⊕ ai+1, bˆ = bi ⊕ bi+1, aˆb = aˆ⊕ bˆ.
9 z0 ← aˆb||z0, z1 ← aˆ||z1, z2 ← (ai+1 ⊕ bi+1)||z2, z3 ← addfirst||z3.
10 addfirst ← aˆ⊕ ((∼ aˆb)⊗ addfirst).
11 end
12 T0 = x(Q⊕ P ), T1 = DBL(T0)
13 if addfirst = 1 then T2 ← ADD(x(Q), T0, x(P ))
14 else T2 ← ADD(x(P ), T0, x(Q))
15 end
16 for i← 0 to 126 do /* main loop */
17 switch [z0,i, z1,i, z2,i, z3,i] do /* zj = (zj,0, . . . , zj,126) ∈ {0, 1}
127, j = 0, . . . 3 */
18 case [0, 0, 0, 0] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T1, T0, x(Q⊕ P ), T2, T1, x(Q)).
19
20 case [0, 0, 0, 1] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T1, T0, x(Q⊕ P ), T2, T1, x(P )).
21
22 case [0, 0, 1, 0] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T1, T0, x(Q⊖ P ), T2, T1, x(Q)).
23
24 case [0, 0, 1, 1] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T1, T0, x(Q⊖ P ), T2, T1, x(P )).
25
26 case [0, 1, 0, 0] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P ), T2, T0, x(Q)).
27
28 case [0, 1, 0, 1] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P ), T2, T0, x(P )).
29
30 case [0, 1, 1, 0] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P ), T2, T0, x(Q)).
31
32 case [0, 1, 1, 1] : T1, T0, T2 ← DBLADDADD(T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P ), T2, T0, x(P )).
33
34 case [1, 0, 0, 0] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T1, x(Q), T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P )).
35
36 case [1, 0, 0, 1] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T0, x(P ), T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P )).
37
38 case [1, 0, 1, 0] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T1, x(Q), T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P )).
39
40 case [1, 0, 1, 1] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T0, x(P ), T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P )).
41
42 case [1, 1, 0, 0] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T0, x(Q), T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P )).
43
44 case [1, 1, 0, 1] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T1, x(P ), T0, T1, x(Q⊕ P )).
45
46 case [1, 1, 1, 0] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T0, x(Q), T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P )).
47
48 case [1, 1, 1, 1] : T1, T2, T0 ← DBLADDADD(T2, T1, x(P ), T0, T1, x(Q⊖ P )).
49
50 endsw
51 end
52 return Tindfinal .
Algorithm 6: Bernstein’s uniform 2-D chain, tailored to the curve in Section 2.
